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The Heightened Standard of Judicial Review in
Cases of Governmental Gender-Based

Discrimination: Ruth Bader Ginsburg's
Influence on the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig v.
Boren
Carlo A. PedrioIi, Uníversity of r.Itah
The legislation at issue is a manifestation, with abizane twist, of the
erstwhile propensity of legislatures to prescribe the conditions under
which women and alcohol may mix.
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Ruth Bader Ginsburg founded and directed the American Civil
Liberties Union Women's Rights Project during the 1970s, where she
participated in cases that dealt with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution Qlistory of the A.C.L.U:
Women's Rights Project, 2003; Markowitz, 1989). From 1972 to 1978,
Ginsburg argued six different gender stereotyping cases before the U.S.
Supreme Court, prevailing in five of the six cases (Supreme Court Historical
Society, 2000).
During the 1970s, Ginsburg played a key role in persuading the U.S.
Supreme Court to adopt a heightened, or more demanding, standard ofjudicial
review for laws that discriminated based on gender. With the 1976 case of Craig
v. Boren, the Supreme Court for the fnst time ever required that laws which
discriminated based on gender must meet a heightened standard ofjudicial
review (Werling & Rieke, 1985). In this case, Ginsburg co-authored the only
amicus curiae, or friend of the court, brief submitted(Craigv. Boren,1976).
Ginsburg wrote on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union to argue that an
Oklahoma law which allowed women to purchase 3.2 percent beer at age l8 but
required men to wait until age2l to purchase the same beer violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This paper will argue that Ginsburg influenced the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision-makng n Craig v. Boren. Craig, which received national news
coverage from the New York Times ("HighCourt," 1976), provided women, and
men, with greater protection against governmental gender-based discrimination.
in making the argument, this paper initially will provide a brief but essential
note on heightened scrutiny in equal protection cases. Next, the paper will
compare the arguments of Ginsburg and Justice William Brennan, who wrote
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the opinion of the Court. Finally, the paper will explain how Ginsbu¡g's appeal
to members of the Court who recently had exhibited moderate positions on the
issue ofequal protection and gender contributed to her success. Essentially,
Ginsburg did an excellentjob adapting to her audience. Such an insight serves as
a reminder that the haditional concept of audience adaptation remains an
important consideration for scholars who seek to understand legal rhetoric.

A Note on Ileightened Scrutiny in Equal Protection Cases
This section ofthe paper offers a briefdiscussion on heightened
scrutiny, which is essential to understandng Craig. Under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the govemment may not treat different
gtoups ofpeople differently without a reason for doing so (Reed v. Reed, 197 l).
ln most cases, the govemment only needs a rational basis for such
discrimination in order to prevail against a claim of an equal protection violation
(Reed,1971).' A rational basis can be any basis that is not "arbitrary and
capricious" @pstein & Walker, 1996, p. 647). Hence, courts give legislatures
broad discretion under the rational basis standard of review.
However, in cases of "'suspect"'classes that have suffered from
historical discrimination, the government faces the burden of offering the
judiciary a much more substantial justification for discrimination (Adarand
Constructors v. Pena, 1995, p. 223'224). The govemment must offer "a
compelling governmental interest" where the means used ate "narrowly tailored
to further that interest" (Adarand Constructors,l995, p. 235). This standard is
much higher and more demanding than the rational basis standard. Such a
standard applies in cases of discrimination based upon race, for instance.'
Today, gender does not receive suspect class status, but it does receive
quasi-suspect class status.' The result in cases of gender-based discrimination is
that although the govemment does not have to show a compelling interest where
the means used a¡e narrowly tailored, the govemment must offer more than a
rational basis for its discrimination. lndeed, the govemment must demonstrate
that a law meets midlevel scrutiny, which requires that the government show
"important govemmental objectives" where the means used'?nust be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives" (Craig,l976'p.197).
The result of this judicial compromise is that the govemment has a harder time
justifring laws that discriminate based on gender.

Comparison of the Arguments of Ginsburg and Brennan
Ginsburg's three major arguments in the A.C.L.U. brief all play key
roles in Brerulan's majority opinion. For instance, Ginsburg's first argument,
that the Oklahoma statute impermissibly pigeonholes individuals based on
gender, is Brennan's conclusion, since thejustice furds a gender-based equal
protection violation. In support of this position, both Ginsburg and Brerman cite
the l9?l case of Reed v. Reed as authority for the principle that the Equal
Protection Clause protects against gender-based discrimination (Motion of
A.C.L.U., 197 8; Craig, 197 6).
Moreover, in the majority opinion Brennan adopts Ginsburg's second
argument, that the Twenty-first Amendment does not shield Oklahoma from
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Iiability. Although Ginsburg concedes that states have a right
to regulate alcohol,
not agree that such regulation limits individual riihts goaånteea .urae.
the Equal Protection clause (Motion of A.c.L.u.,
l97s). õitid difierent
authority, Brennan makes the same point (Craig,1976).
Furthermore, inihe court's opinion Brennan accepts Ginsburg,s third
argument, that the defendants' proffered statistics fail to juôti$,
the genãer_based
discrimination. Both rhetors point out that arrest statistics do not
acãount for the
'lfiu"lty factor," as Ginsburg calls it (lr4otion of A.C.L.U., 197g, p. 197.¡.
Ginsburg speaks of the "fatherly warrúng" that a young wolnan
mây receive
instead of an anest (Motion of A.c.L.u
rolt,p. r97),while Brennan speaks of
a young woman's being ',chivalrously escorted
home" (Craig, 1g76, p. iOg).
rhetors also agree that driving fataliries by theÀselvis áo nåip.ouá tt
T.Yo
the drivers were drinking3.2 percent beer (Motion of
A.c.L.u., tizti craig, "t
1976) Additionally, the rhetors are in accord that a roadsid"
,urv"y f"il, to
establish a solid connection between young men and3.2percent
båer (Motion
of A,C.L.U., 1978; Craig,1976). Hence, Ginsburg,s threä
major arguments all
appear as keys to Brennan's opinion.
she does

-

An Explanation of Ginsburg's Influence on the Court
Among other questions, the rhetorician who studies legal argument

want to ask the following: who are the members of the rhetor,Jaudiãnce?
predispositions do the members of the audience have

will

what

towa¡ds the rhetor's topic?
appeal to the members of the audience?
[e {eto1
6fr""t"y A
llet$erg,2000). These questions play important roles in an àalysií of
Ginsburg's influence on the Court.
Howdoes

Ginsburg's Audience and Its predispositions
included

lncraig, Ginsburg had nine justices as audience members. The justices
william Brennan, Byron white, Thurgood Marsha[, Lewis powell,

Harry Blackmun, potter Stewart, Warren Éurger, and
William Rehnquist (Craig, t976).
with regard to the predispositions of the members of Ginsburg's
audience, the 1973 u. s. supreme Òou¡t case of Frontiero
v. Richardsàn can act
as a ba¡ometer.a In Frontiero, which dealt with a gender-based
discrimination
issue similar to the issue ncylig,s the justices rplit on the
voting *a,""ro"ing.
Brennan, white, and Marshall all supported a heightened
standaid oi scrutiny iir
cæes of governmental gender-based discrimination (Frontiero
v. Richardsoi,
1973)' Powell, Burger, and Blackmun agreed with the court that
there was
govemmental gender-based discrimination, but these three justices
would not
use heightened scrutiny in evaluating such discrimination;
instead they relied
upon the rational basis test (Frontiero, 1973). stewart merely
in th.
judgment (Frontiero, 1973). rn contrast, Rehnquist
"on",-"d
dissenteá from
the judgment
(Frontiero,l973). Stevens was not yet on the Court in 1973.
Following the
Çourt's split in the Frontiero case, a leading but
fragmented decision on the issuJof gender-based governmental
diícrimination
during the 1970s, Ginsburg had seveial factions to whom she could
argue. First,
she had allies in Brennan, white, and Marshall, all of whom
favored hãighteneá
scrutiny. Second, she had potential allies in powell, Burger, Blaclcnun,
and
John Paul Stevens,

_

^
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Stewart, all of whom previously had struck down a statute that discriminated
based on gender, but none ofwhom had expressed an acceptance of strict
scrutiny in such a case. Third, Ginsburg had Rehnquist, who had dissented in
Frontiero. Fourth, she had Stevens, who had not been on the Court to express an
opinion in Frontiero. Essentially, the four factions ranged from friendly, to

potentially friendly, to unfriendly, to unknown. To win inCraig, Ginsburg
needed to get five justices to side with her.

Ginsburg's Appeals to the Moderates on the Court
Given the various factions on the Court, Ginsburg needed to appeal to
the four moderates on the issue of equal protection and gender-Powell, Burger,
Blackrnun, and Stewart-in order to win. The votes of at least two moderates, in
addition to the votes of the three justices who accepted heightened scrutiny in
the area of equal protection, would give Ginsburg's position a majority of the
members of the Court. This portion of the paper will discuss the appeals in
Ginsburg's brief, as aimed at the members of the Court who were more
moderate on the issue ofequal protection and gender.
To begin with, in the A.C.L.U. brief Ginsburg omits one key argument.
She does not argue that the Court should adopt a heightened standard of scrutiny

in cases of govemmental gender-based discrimination. Ginsburg's only
reference to a potentially new standard of scrutiny is implicit at best. When
referring to the Supreme Court's prior decision in the 1975 case of Stanton v.
Stanton, Ginsburg notes that a state's sex/age line established for child support
purposes could not withstand careful review, whether the standard of review was
"'compelling state interest, or rational basis, or something in between"'(Motion
of A.C.L.U., 1978, p. 185). In quoting the Court in Stanton, Ginsburg does little
more than suggest that gender-based classifications will fail regardless of the
standa¡d of review. This strategy is a clever appeal to the moderate members of
the Court who previously had declined to use more than rational basis to strike
down a law that discriminated based on gender.
In her brief, Ginsburg makes three main arguments. First, Ginsbwg
axgues that Oklahoma's classification impermissibly pigeonholes on the basis of
gender (Motion of A.C.L.U., 1978). Citing the l97l case of Reed v. Reed along
with other more recent cases, she points out that Supreme Court precedent
stands in contrast to the Oklahoma statute because such precedent forbids
gender-based classifications that rest on "overbroad generalizations" about
gender (Motion of A.C.L.U., 1978,p.183). Ginsburg suggests that the
difference in age at which men and women can purchase alcohol represents such
an'ooverbroad generalization" about gender since the defendants have not
offered a sufficient link between Oklatroma's legislative goal of haffic safety
and the means used to fi¡rther that goal (Motion of A.C.L.U., 1978, p. 183). By
focusing on what she characterizes as a law which rests on gender stereotypes,
Ginsburg urges the four moderate members of the Court to see that the
Oklahoma law simply goes too far to withstand judicial scrutiny.
Second, Ginsburg argues that the Twenty-first Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution does not shield Oklahoma's law from scrutiny (Motion of A.C.L.U.,
1978). For reference, in relevant portion this Amendment states, "The
transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of
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the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited" (united states constitutional Amendment
xxl, 1933). This language suggests that the states can decide how to regulate

alcohol (Garner, I 999).

'Conceáing

that Oklahoma can regulate the sale and consumption of
alcohol, Ginsburg lgu.. that such regulation cannot justiff "gross classification
by genáer" Oaoti-on õf ¡..C.1,.U., 1978, p. 193). Ginsburg uses the offensive
tffith"ti""i situation of a state's regulating the sale of alcohol based on race to
¿tå* race/gender analogy and thuõ points out how unacceptable the Oklahoma
"
gender-baseã
distinction is (lr4otion of A.C.L.U., l97S). By linkin-S genderpoint
based discrimination and race-based discrimination, Ginsburg makes the
than
worse
is
alcohol
that gender-based discrimination in the context of selling
by
Hence,
rights'
any [otential hann to states' Twenty-fi¡st Amendment
showcasing the infringed rights of human beings, and not states, Ginsburg
presents another appeal to the moderate members of the Court'
Third, Giïsburg argues that the defendants' statistics fail to establish "a
(tramc
fair and substantial retattnstrip between the hypothesized legislative e{

'

safety) and the statutory criterion employed (a sex/age 3.2 beer line)" (lr4otion of
e.C.LU., 1978, p. 196). In making this argument to the four moderates on the
Court, wúo in oråer to decide the outcome of the case could examine the barrage
of staíistics very carefully, Ginsburg pays close attention to the facts in the case.
Ginsburg offeriseveral points to support her argument against the
statistics. For exaãple, the fact that the oklatroma state and oklahoma city
male drunk-drivingarrests substantially exceeded female arrests does not
necessarily establiãh any connection between D.U.I. anests and 3 .2 percent beer
(N4otion of A.C.L.U., tÞZS¡. eko, the statistics ignore the ll'clivaþ factor,"'
via which the intoúcated male may be subject to a¡rest while the intoxicated
female may receive an escort homè, "perhaps with a fatherly warning" (Motion
of A.C.L.ú., 1978, p. 197). Additionally, ttre anest statistics fail to account for
multiple arrests, since one man rather than 47 men may have been subject to
arrest 47 times (Motion of A.C.L.U., 1978).
Furthermore, an Oklahoma City roadside survey is unhelpful to
defendants' case. During the evenings, Oklahoma City had surveyed drivers as
to whether the drivers ¿t-L i" general or had been drinking on the particular
evening in question (Motion ofÂ.C.L.U., 1978). If a giv91d4v9r answered that
he or sñe had been drinking, the authorities performed a blood alcohol test
(Motion of A.C.L.U., l97S). As Ginsburg attempts to make clear in her brief,
the authorities made no inquiry into possible consumption of 3.2 percent beer,

only into whether the drink wãs "beer, wire, or liquor" (Motion of A.G.L.U.,

1978,p.201).

a detailed refutation of the defendants' statistics, Ginsburg makes
a strong case that the oklahoma law does not further the alleged legislative
objectiie of protecting young men and the public (Motion of AC.L.U., 1978).
Ginsburg's attention to ¿"taii is necessary to make her case to the four
moderates on the Court, for whom the defendants' barrage of statistics might be

with

dispositive. By showing weakness after weakness in the conclusion the
defendants dràw from their statistics, Ginsburg strengthens her own appeal to
the four moderates on the Court
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The Court's Vote
In the end, history indicates that Ginsburg won the votes of seven
members of the Court, which struck down the Oklahoma statutes. As one may
have guessed, Brennan, White, and Marshall voted in Ginsburg's favor (Craig,
1976). Powell and Stevens did likewise, as did Blachnun and Stewart (Craig,
1976). Rehnquist and Burger dissented. Of the four members of the Court who
tn Fronliero expressed moderate views on the issue of governmental genderbased discrimination, Ginsburg won the votes of tb¡ee: Powell, Blackmun, and
Stewart. These three votes were insfumental in the Court's adopting her
perspective nCraig.
Despite Ginsburg's not asking for it, six justices, including Brennan,
White, Marshall, Powell, Stevens, and Blachnun even voted for a degree of
heightened scrutiny, specifically mid-level scrutiny, in cases of gender-based
discrimination.In Frontiero, Brennan, White, and Marshall had made a¡r
argument for a heightened standard of review, andtnCraig,powell and
Blachnun also agreed to a heightened sta¡rdard of review, as did Stevens.
However, the proposed heightened standard of review in FronÍíero was strict
scrutiny, while the heightened standard of review nCraig was mid-level, or
less-exacting, scrutiny. Nonetheless, Craig stíll elevated the level ofjudicial
scrutiny in cases of governmental gender-based discrimination.
Closing Thoughts
This paper has traced the influence of Ruth Bader Ginsburg,s amicus
curiae brief, the only such brief submitted in the case, on the U.S. Supreme
Court's reasoning n Craig v. Boren. To do so, the paper provided a background
note on heightened scrutiny in equal protection cases. Also, the paper compared
the arguments of Ginsburg and Brennan, noting the key similarities. Lastly, the
paper looked at how Ginsburg zuccessfully made arguments to the members of
the court who in Frontiero v. Richardsonhad adopted a moderate stance on the
issue of governmental gender-based discrimination.
The analysis of this paper suggests at least two implications for
rhetorical theory and rhetorical practice. Regarding theory, the classical concept
of audience adaptation remains important, especially in helping argumentation
scholars oçlain how lawyers successfully persuade appellate judges.
understanding judges' predispositions to current issues in light of prior judicial
decisions is key. Regarding practice, the lesson for the rhetor who seeks to win
over an audience of fractured perspectives is to appeal to the center in moderate
terms. A rhetor might not be able to win both ends of the spectrum of
perspectives, but the rhetor may be able to temper the argument so that one end
of the spectrum still accepts the rhetor's perspective and the middle of the
spectrum comes along. In cases where the rhetor only needs to win a majority of
the members of the audience, such an approach is a viable option,
Although some feminists have criticized as "'phallocentric"'
Ginsburg's approach of working within the existing male-dominated legal
system (Markowitz, 1989, p. 76), denying Ginsburg's influence on the
heightened standard ofjudicial scrutiny that protects women, as well as men,
from govemmental gender-based discrimination would be difficult. Because of
Craig,legislatures not only refonned discriminatory state laws but also may
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have declined to pass additional discriminatory laws @arcy & Sanbrano, 1997).
Given this type of influence, it should not be a complete surprise that twenty
years after Craig, Jlstice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the important U.,S.
3upr.r" Court majority opinion tn United States v. Virginia that reaffirmed the

ground-breaking equal protection doctine of Craig (1996).'

Notes
include classes based on age,
'Various classes receive rational basis review. Some examples
disability, wealth, and sexral orientation. See Cohen, ÌV., & Varat, J. D. (1998). Constitulional law:
Cases and materials. Westbury, New York: Foundation.
2Other
suspect classes æe based on alienage and national origin' See Cohen & Va¡at'
3Another quasi-suspect class is based on illegitimacy. Sce Cohen & Varat.
aln
Frontiero (197j), the govemment refused to allow a female member of the U.S. Air Force to
claim benefits for her spouse that male service members could claim for their spouses. Essentially,
the law in question prefened female service spouses to male service spouses.
legally distinguishable. The.distinction
'The issues in th, t*o c"r". were very closely related but still
lay in the Constitutional authority foieach decision.lnCraig,Oklahoma took the discriminatory
góvernmeutal action, so that case dealt the Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment.
l¡ Frontiero,the U.S. government took the disc¡iminatory action, so thât case concerned the Due

of the Fifth Amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendm€nt pertains to the states, whereas, at least with regard to the Due
process Clause, the Fifth Amendment pertains to the federal govemment. Constitutional language
and case law so indicate. The Fourteenth Amendment uses the language 'No State shall . . ." to list
various prohibitions. See United States Coûstitutional Amendment )íV (1868)' Although the Fifth

Process Clause

Amendment does not use language that speciñcally refers to the federal governmeût, the U.S.
Supreme Courr mled long agó t¡ãt the Silt of Rights, including the Fifrh Am9$m91t applies to the
federal government. See Banon v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). In the
twentieth cenhry, the Court applied most provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states, but a
discussion of thó incorporation dochine must wait for another project. See Cohen, W., & Varat' J. D
(1998). Constitulional law: Cases and materials. Westbury, New York: Foundation'
Be*t re the Fifth Amendment does not contain an Equal Protection Clause, the above-noted
distilction b€tween two Constitutional authorities is necessary in equal proÛection cases where the
federal govemment is the defendant. Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth
Anrendoent's Due Process Clause to include the principle ofequal protection' In the 1950s' the
Court zuggestcd rl'"r equal protection and due process "are not mutually exclusive" concepts. See
solting v. Shârpe, 347 v.S: 497 , 4gg (1954). In the 1970s, the Court recognized "the equal
pmrcclion comþnent of the of the Fiflü Amendment's Due Process Clause." See Vance v. Bradley,
¿¿O U.S. 93,gi (lg7g). ln rhe 1990s, tlre Court held "that the Constitution imposes upon federal,
*ate, and local govemmental actors the same obligation to respect the personal right to equal
protection ofthã laws.- See Adarand Constsuctors v, Pena, 515 U.S. 200,231'232 (1995).
buch sbrerænb ûom the High Court indicate that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
assurnes thc duty ofprotecting individuals' cqual protection rights against the power ofthe federal
govemmeû¡ Ergo, in equal protection cåses where the federat govemment is the defendant, the Due
process Clause ãf the f iffh Amendment functions much like the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fou¡teenth Amendment.

eÍ1¡e
United Søres v. Virginia case involved gender-based discrimination at the Virginia Military
lnstitute (VMI), a public-institution, which had a long-standing policy of refirsing to admit female
ca¿ets (tiSq. The Supreme Court struck down this policy as a violation ofequal protection.
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